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1.  Introduction 
The Bank’s policy on fragile states, as outlined in its Policy for Enhanced Engagement in Fragile 
States, is to assist fragile states move from the condition of fragility to a path of sustainable 
recovery and development by providing them with tailored assistance at critical junctures of their 
re-engagement and recovery process.  To achieve these objectives, the Bank set up the Fragile 
State Facility as a distinct financing vehicle in March 2008. The Fragile State Facility has three 
pillars: supplemental support, arrears clearance and targeted support. The cumulative resource 
envelope of the Fragile State Facility was US$888 million as of end December 2009. These 
resources were mainly from the African Development Fund (ADF) and African Development 
Bank net income. The Facility welcomes donor contributions, which has been modest to date. 
The chart below, showing the allocation of the total resource envelope across the three pillars, 
indicates that just over half of the initial portfolio of the Fragile State Facility was allotted to 
arrears  clearance.  However,  the  demand  for  targeted  support  for  capacity  building  and 
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Pillar I – Supplemental Support 
This window provides support for infrastructure investment, rehabilitation and governance to 
post crisis/transition countries. Of the US$383 million allocated to Pillar I, US$132 million have 
been disbursed as at first quarter 2010 and US$164 million are earmarked for the 2010 FSF 
pipeline of operations.   
Pillar II – Arrears Clearance  
Support under this pillar is intended to help eligible countries clear their debt arrears. As of 
September  2009,  Togo  and  Côte  d’Ivoire  had  received  US$385  million  under  this  window. 
Support for Cote d’Ivoire and Togo brought the total number of countries that have benefited 
from the Bank’s arrears clearance program to seven countries - Burundi, Republic of Congo, 
Central African Republic, Comoros, Liberia, Cote d’Ivoire and Togo.     
Pillar III – Targeted Support 
This  pillar  provides  targeted  support  for  capacity  building,  service  delivery  and  knowledge 
development. The support provided falls within four categories. The share of each category in 
the total for Pillar III is indicated below in parenthesis. 
   public finance management and public administration (63%),  
  private sector and institutional development(20%),  
  agriculture and extractive industries (13%) ; and 
   social sectors (5%). 
 
2.  Impact of AfDB Support 
At present, an assessment of the impact of the Fragile State Facility may be premature, given that 
the Facility was established only two years ago. Nevertheless, there are indications of tangible 
benefits  for  some  countries.  The  FSF  arrears  clearance  process,  for  example,  has  enabled 
countries  under  arrears-induced  sanctions  to  quickly  re-engage  with  the  international.  The 
process has also proven effective in stabilizing countries coming out of conflict or crisis with 
difficult  economic  and  financing  challenges  and  needs  and  has  opened  the  door  for  such 
countries to gain access to HIPC and MDRI, thus providing them with much needed resources 
for  supporting  their  socio-economic  recovery  programs.  The  FSF  has  also  supported  the 
provision  of  vital  basic  services,  especially  the  provision  of  water  supply  and  sanitation  to 
countries like Comoros, Liberia and Zimbabwe, thus improving the living standards of project 
beneficiaries.  The provision of well targeted technical assistance (TA) and capacity building 
programs have contributed in the development of credible country systems that are crucial in 
fighting  corruption  and  ensuring  that  the  scarce  public  resources  in  fragile  states  reach  the   3 
intended beneficiaries. There is also evidence of increasing demand for support for improved 
transparency  and  accountability  through  the  strengthening  of  public  financial  management 
systems. Currently this support is provided in the DRC, Liberia, Sudan, Togo and  Zimbabwe. 
  
Projects in the pipeline include US$6.6 million in institutional support to Togo for governance 
and economic reform,  US$54 million in Burundi to pursue a road infrastructure project and 
economic  reforms  program,  US$9.8million  in  Sierra  Leone  to  finance  a  water  supply  and 
sanitation project, and US$90million in DRC to support an electricity  power generation and 
distribution project. 
 
3.  Lessons Learnt 
Operationally, the Fragile State Facility remains a rapid response and development instrument in 
very weak institutional environments. The following are some of the lessons that the Bank has 
learnt in supporting the efforts of fragile states to grapple with the numerous challenges facing 
them. 
Sequencing is critical to the success of reform in fragile states. Zimbabwe is a striking example 
of a country where sequencing of reform was particularly important. Over the years the country’s 
relationship  with  donors  became  strained,  leading  to  the  imposition  of  sanctions.  
Macroeconomic indicators deteriorated, culminating in hyperinflation, and the collapse of the 
national currency. The signing of a power-sharing agreement between the government and the 
opposition  in  2009  provided  an  opportunity  for  a  renewed  engagement  with  development 
partners. Reform was needed on all fronts: On the macroeconomic front there was a need for 
fiscal adjustment to cut chronic budget deficits and stabilize the economy; determining whether 
to  introduce  a  new  currency  given  the  collapse  of  the  existing  currency;  determining  the 
appropriate exchange rate regime; reforming and re-capitalising the central bank, and defining its 
mandate and areas of activity; and correcting price distortions. Getting the order of these and 
other reform measures right was a major challenge. 
The African Development Bank can take the lead in supporting countries like Zimbabwe facing 
isolation  by  the  international  community.  It  can  do  so  by  providing  emergency  financial 
assistance, supporting policy reform and through advocacy. The Bank is able to leverage the 
flexibility  of  its  procedures  to  adapt  to  country-specific  circumstances.  Being  an  African 
institution, Regional Member Countries perceive the Bank as their own institution. This helps to 
foster a healthy working relationship between the Bank and its clients.  
Despite the huge financing requirements, the absorptive capacity of fragile states tends to be low. 
Strengthening  their  absorptive  capacity  is  therefore  a  key  priority.    Development  partners 
sometimes impose a wide range of disbursement and reporting procedures, taxing already weak 
government  institutional  capacity.  Harmonization  and  simplification  of  such  procedures  will 
increase aid absorptive capacity. Furthermore, care needs to be taken to ensure that aid does not   4 
lead to the setting up of a large institutional structure, in parallel with the existing government 
structure.  Such  parallel  structures  result  in  duplication  and  weaken  government  capacity  to 
manage the development process. The “cherry picking” of the best local brains from government 
and tertiary institutions further weakens domestic capacity.  
 
The Fragile State Facility allocates  funds to  beneficiary  countries  partly  on the basis of the 
performance-based allocation (PBA) system. Fragile states are also eligible for financing under 
the  African  Development  Fund  where  funding  decisions  are  based  exclusively  on  the  PBA 
system. However, the PBA formula does not fully capture the extent of vulnerability and the 
underlying structural conditions of fragile states. As a result, resources allocated under the PBA 
system tend to be low relative to needs. The PBA system awards more funds to countries with a 
good  policy  environment  (as  captured  by  the  Country  Policy  and  Institutional  Assessment 
(CPIA) Index). However, this implicitly penalizes countries for being fragile as a poor policy 
environment is itself often a defining feature of state fragility.  Moreover, because CPIA ratings 
are  retrospective,  they  may  not  adequately  capture  recent  developments  in  a  country.  The 
backward-looking  feature  of  the  PBA  system  further  penalizes  fragility  and  takes  away  the 
opportunity of using aid to improve stability and the policy environment. These limitations have 
lead  to  a  growing  debate  on  the  need  to  revisit  the  PBA  formula  to  take  into  account 
considerations of the underlying structural conditions and vulnerability of countries.  
 
4.  Going Forward  
 
A growing body of experience and lessons on fragile states is being accumulated within the Bank 
and outside. It would be useful to document and analyze such experiences and lessons in the 
form  of  policy  briefs,  working  papers,  scholarly  articles,  and  other  knowledge  products. 
Furthermore, research and analytical work is needed  on a range of critical issues  for fragile 
states. Development partners have pursued a wide range of policies and practices in fragile states 
whose relative efficacy remains a matter of speculation. There is little knowledge about what 
works and what does not and many questions remain unanswered. What type of aid suits fragile 
states? Is budgetary support appropriate in the face of weak institutions for accountability and 
transparency? In what circumstances has aid been effectively utilized? What has been the impact 
of aid on macroeconomic stability? Finally, is the PBA an appropriate framework for resource 
allocation? 
 
Strategic partnerships will need to be nurtured at the local, regional and international levels. At 
the local and regional levels, such partnerships would enhance the participation of local, national 
and regional institutions and stakeholders in the development process. At the international level, 
such  partnerships  can  improve  coordination  of  development  assistance,  thereby  avoiding 
duplication and waste.  It would also reduce the transactions costs that aid recipients face in 
dealing with a multiplicity of donor conditions.   
 